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In the

SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
Case No.
7249

In the matter of the estate of Anna D. Walton, deceased.

BRIEF O·F RESPON·DENT

At pp. 16 and 17 of appellant brief the commission
method of computation appears. Reference to stipulation
of facts (Rec. 62) discloses that the net estate is $25,444.77 and not $26,983.93, and see appellants brief p. 5,
para. 5.
The executrix, Elizabeth M. Jerrell, and the State
Tax Commission have by stipulation fi'led herein agreed
upon the submission of a controversy without action for
the purpose of obtaining a declaratory, and final judgment as to the meaning and application of the present
inheritance tax statute.
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The testatrix, Anna D. Walton, had five children;three daughters, to each of whom was bequea;thed an
undivided one-fifth of the estate; Thomas D. Walton, a
son, who died in 1940, leaving four children, to each of
which children is bequeathed an undivided one-twentieth
of the estate; a son, Franklin ·G. Walton, to whom beneficially is bequeathed a life estate with remainder over
to his children. This one-fifth of the estate is in trust to
E. A. Walton, et aL, as trustees.
The principal questions are: First, does the word
''children'' include grandchildren of the testatrix. If it
does then it is not claimed that there is any tax liability
here, either in respect of Thomas' children or Franklin's
children.
Secondly, if the term ''children'' does not include
grandchildren of the testatrix then should the tax be applied as to the Franklin one-fifth upon his life estate as
well as upon the remainder to his children.
'Thirdly, if the executrix be wrong in her p~rincipal
and first contention, then should the exemptions with
respect to the part going to the children begin at one
dollar or at ten thousand and one dollars.
BRIEF AND ARG U!iENT
I

IN SUC'H A STATUTE CHILDREN INCLUDES
GRAND·CHILDREN.

It will not be disputed that in resp2ct of wills the
general rule is that if it appears that the intention of tlu~
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testator makes it manifest that grandchildren were intended to be included such intention will be given effect.
The authorities seem unanimous upon this point. Pa$sim.
In statutes usually as we have been .able to discover
about t\vo thirds of the jurisdictions are our way and
about one-third are apparently, or superficially as to
some of the cases, seem against us.
It is our contention that the equity, reason, justice,
and weight of authority sup·port our position.
Prior to the amendment of 1947 there was no discrimination between direct and collateral heirs, and this
amendment as indicated by the title, and the Ianguage of
the statute itself is manifestly designed to bring our system into line in a general way, not only with the Federal
Statute but practically all of the other jurisdictions, State
and Territorial, making up the American Union, nearly
all of which both as to rate of tax and amount of exemp~-·;
tion discriminate sharply between lineals and collaterals.
The same discrimination between lineals and collaterals, including of course spouses with lineals, is found
in the common law and in all the statutes of descent in
the various jurisdictions of the United States, and as was
held in the Cupples case in Missouri, 199 S.W. 556, the
inheritance tax or state tax statutes are to he construed
in light of descent statutes.
In Kyle v. Kyle, 18 Indiana, 108, a section of the act
concerning descents provided, ''If a husband or wife dies
intestate, leaving no children and no father or mother, the
whole of his property ... shall go to the survivors.''
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The court held that the gener,al itntent exhibited in
the descent statutes to take care of descendants required
a holding that the term child includes grandchildren.
. In Eshleman's Appeal, 74 Pa. 42, the statute dealt
with advances to a ''child.'' The court held that such included advances to a grandchild whose father was dead.
The Court cited many cases and said: ''When the expression in. a statute is special or pHrticular but the
reason is general, the expression should be deemed general."
To the same effect is Storey's Appeal, 83 Pa. 89, 96.
In Morin v. Holliday (Ind. Ap.) 77 N.E. 61, the court
held that the words, "illegitimate child or children" in
a statute of inheritance includes grandchildren.
In Scott v. Silvers, 64 Ind. 76-78, it is held that in a
statute of descent the words, "children alive',- must be
held to mean 'children or their descendants alive'."
These cases were followed in Davis v. Thompson, 179
Ind. 539, 101 N .E. 108.
In Starret v. McKim, 90 Ark. 520, 119· S.W. 824, the
court held that in a statute of descent the word "children'' includes descendants in any degree.
In Phillips v. Lawing, 150 Ala. 186, 43 So. 494, the
court held that the words "child or children'' in a descent
statute mean "a child or children represented in the distribution of the estate whether living or represented by
descendants," "where such interpretation is required hy
reason and justice.''
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In Kaha,vanui v. Mannakea, 20 Hawaii, 114, the word
"children" in a descent statute is held to include "grandchildren. ' '
The court approved Walton v. Cotton, 60 U.S. 355,
which held that in a pension act using the word '' children,'' ''grandchildren'' are included in the equity of the
statute.
In Cutting v. Cutting, 6 F. 259, the court had before
it the construction of the word ''children'' in a donation
act of Congress and, holding that the word includes children of a deceased child, said : ' ' The children of the deceased child of Charles Cutting are certainly within the
equity of the statute.
In Keeney v. McVoy, 206 Mo. 42, 1035 S.W. 946, the
above line of authorities was ap~proved and followed.
In Walton v. Cotton, 19 How. 355, 15 L. Ed. 659, the
syllabus, which reflects exactly the court's holding is,
":The word 'children' in the Pension Acts ... embraces
the grandchildren of the deceased pensioner whether
their parents died before or after his decease.''
In re Cup·ples ·Estate, 272 Mo. 465, 199 S.W. 556
involved inheritance tax exemption. There was no tax as
to children whether by blood or adoption nor as to lineal
descendant of testator. It was claimed by the revenue collector that a child of the deceased's adopted child was
not within the category of persons as to whom the tax:
did not apply. The court affirmed the judgment against
the collector, holding that construction of the inheritance
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tax statute should he controlled by the general policy exhibited by the statutes of descents, and that the child of
the adopted child was (though not so literally) included
as a child or descendant of the testator. The Court said,
"The word 'children' may whenever reason requires it
be construed to include their descendants.''
To same effect are Estate of Winchester, 140 Cal.
469, 74 P. 10. Succession of Vives, 35 La. Ann. 371; In
re Williams, 62 Mo. App. 339; Beehe v. Estabrook, 79
N.Y. 246, 250.
In the last case the court said that in conformity
with the general spirit and design of the descent statutes
and of cognate provisions the general principle is ''that
there shall he equality between the children of the intestate (deceased) and the descendants of deceased children per stirpes, hence the word 'children' includes
grandchildren or descendants.'' The Court further said
that statutes in pari materia are to be construed together
and it would be assumed that the legislature intended a
harmonious system.
We submit there is no harmony in a system that
penalizes both the children of a deceased, and orphan
grandchildren by putting the orphan grandchildren in
a class with the most remote of collateral kindred.
See also 3 Restatement of the Law of Property, Sec.
285 (2) (a) (b) (d).
As we have said, nearly aH the jurisdictions have by
their estate or inheritance tax statutes favored lineals,
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especially lineal deseendants, and a great many of them
fayor them both as to rates and as to exemptions.
See the following statutes: Code of Alabama 1940;
Title 51; Second Digest of Arkansas Statutes 19'3'7, page
3450; Deerings California General Rues 1937, Act. 8495;
Third Colorado Statutes Ann. 1935, p·age 575, 6; General
Statutes Connecticut, Section 1366; Delaware Revised
Code 1935; pages 34 and 35; Florida Statutes 1941,
Chapter 198; Code of Georgia Title, 92; R·evise·d Law
Hawaii, 1945, Sec. 5555; 1 Ada. Court Ann. 1932, Sec.
14-405, 14-407; Extra Session of 1935, Chap. 56, 120
Smith-Hurd Ann. Statutes, 120-375; Baldwin Ind. Statutes 1934, Sec. 15940; 1 Code of Iowa 1946, Sec. 450.9;
450.10; General Statutes 1939, Sec. 8556; Baldwin's Ky.
Revised Statutes 1942, Sec. 140.070, 140.080; 2 Revised
Statutes Main 1944, Chap. 142; Ann. Code Amended 19'39,
Article 81, Sec. 109, 110; Second Ann. Laws Mass., Chap.
65; 1 Minn. Statutes 1945, Sec. 291.03, 291.05; 1 Mo. Revised Statutes of 1939, Sec. 573; 3 Mont. Revised Codes
1931, Sec. 10378; 4 Neb. Revised Statutes, Sec. 77-2004;
1 Revised Laws N.H. 1943, page 349; 2 N.M. Statutes
1941, Sec. 34-102; 2 Revised Statutes N.J. 1937, Sec. 54,
34-2; N.C. Code 1939, ·sec. 78, 80 (3); 5 No. Dakota Revised Code 1943, 57-3711; 4 A Publications Ohio General
Code, Sec. 5334, 5335; 2 Oregon Compiled Laws 1940,
Sec. 20-105; Oklahoma Statutes Ann. 68, Sec. 989 G; Purdons Pa. Statutes 1936, 'Title 72; General La,vs Rhode
Island 38, Chap. 43, Sec. 7 and 8; 2 Code of Laws So.
Calif. 1942, Sec. 2480; ·Compiled Laws North Dakota
1929, Sec. 6830; Second Williams Tennessee Code, Sec.
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1266, 1267; 28 Vernons Texas Civil .Statutes, Article
7118-7122; Public Laws Vt. 1933, Sec. 1048, 1049; Va.
Code 1942~ page 2.662; Remington Revised Statutes
Washington. 1940, · pocket part page 183, W. V a. Code
1943, Sec. 843, 845; Wisconsin Statutes 1945, 72.02, 72.04.

We ref.er to the above as illustrative of the universal
re.cognition. in English and American Law of the equity
and justice of treating lineal descendants as a distinct
and preferred class and as tending to show that the
legislature did not intend to put grandchildren or other
lineal descendants in the same category ,as collateral
kindred. The po'licy of favoring lineals in descent statutes
is shown emphatically by our non-lapse statute, S.ec. 1011-35 U.C.A., which p~rovides that where a legatee predeceases the testator the legacy will go to the lineal desc.endants.
''One of the cardinal principles of statutory construction is that the court will look to the reason, spirit
and sense of the legislation as indicated by the entire context and sub ject matter dealing with the subject.''
1

Masich v. U.
P. 2d. 612.

·s.

Smelting Co. (Utah), 191

Ml parts of a statute must be subservi·ent to the
general intent of the statute.
Crawford Construction of Statutes, Sec. 202.
State v. Franklin, 63 Utah 442, 22·6· P. 674.
Inheritance tax statutes should be construed against
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the state when doubtful.
61 C.J. 1626.
The whole of the taxing statute, including that part
relating to exemptions should he construed strictly
against the state.
People v. Snyder, 353 Ill. 184, 18 N.E. 158, 88
A.L.R. 101'2 and note.
·
II
IN NO EVENT IS IT PR!OPER TO TREAT THE FRANKLIN WALTON LIFE ESTATE AS N~OT EXEMPT.

As the one-fifth going to Franklin G. Walton and
children consists of a life estate and a remainder certainly the life estate goes to a ·child in the first degree.
Each estate should be valued by using morta'lity
tables, etc., and this is true whether the statute so provides or not.
Ithaca Trust Company v. U. S., 279 U. S. 151,
73 L. Ed. 647.
See also cas.es cited in 127 America State Reports,
page 1076.
III
THE FIRST $10,000 IS. N:OT TAXED AT ALL.

There is no attemp~t in our statute to tax any part of
the first $10,000.00 of an estate. Consequently one should
start the exemption that is provided by the statute at just
over ten thousand dollars.
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Let us take an estate of ex.actly ten thousand dollars
where all of it by will or descent statutes goes to collaterals. We understand that the p·ractice is not to tax
it at all. (Record 62.) .But, suppose the estate is ten thousand one hundred dollars, ten thousand dollars going to
collaterals and one hundred dollars going to a husband,
wife, or child. Literally, under the present statute, the
exemption would be one hundred doHars and only that,
all of which results in an absurdity.

As the tax begins at $10,000,, so also sh!ould the

ex~,

ception ·exempting the favored spouse and lineals begin at
the same point.
We submit that the construction heretofore made by
the comm_ission that the first $10,000 is not taxable nor
taxed at all is .correct, and that the exemption provided
begins exactly at the point and amount where the tax;
begins.
Otherwise, the exception to the rule is broader than
the rule its-elf which is impossible and absurd.
Here the Commission concedes an ·exemption as to
three-fifths of the estate· (about $15,000), but it wants
$10,000 of that !exemption satisfied out of something
against which no tax is asserted hy the statute.
1

I

IV
APPELLANT',S AUTHORITIES

Counsel for T·ax Commission cites 61 C.J. 1611 and
in Re; McKennans Est. (S.D.) 130 N.W. 33, holding the
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legislature has constitutional power to classify, we do
not contend otherwise. If the legislature here had explicitly named grandchildren and so put them in a class
outside "children" that would perhaps end the matter
and there \Vould be no need for interpretation or construction. However, the case cited says the power is
limited, and does not extend to '·'an unnatural plan."
We submit that to construe "chHdren" to exclude
"grandchildren" and so to put grandchildren into the
same class as third and fourth cousins exhibits a wholly
''unnatural plan.''
Counsel says ''The law seems to be well settled.''
(His way, of course, he means.) Let us examine his cases:
In Re O'Connors Will, 251 N.Y.S., 686 holds that the
daughter of a deceased step·son is not included in the
term ''child.'' However, if the case is thought to be
against us it is in conf,lict with the court of appeals
case of Beebe v. Estabrook, 79 N.Y. 246.
~IcQueen

v. Stephens (Tex.), 100 S.W. 2d 1053 is
a will ease, involving meaning of word child in the p·retermission statute and it appeared that the intention of
the testator was not to include the grandchild 'vhose
mother was intentionally pretermitted. It is quite obvious that the word '·'child" in such statute would have
the narrower meaning.
In Re Curry's Estate, 39 Cal. 529 is cited. The opinion emphasises the fact that the holding that the \vord
''child'' does not include ''grandchildren'' applies to
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children of collaterals, not to direct descendants, a very
different case in the reason and justice of the matter.
Hoggatt v. Clapton, Tenn., 217 S.W. 657, is a will
case and the court very properly held that whether ''children'' includes grandchildren or not is a question of
intention of the testator. The Court noted especially that
the testa tor had used the expression as to one devisee
''children or grandchildren'' and as to another only the
word 'children' and treated such differentiation as very
important.
Falter v. Walker (Okla.), 149 P. 1111 holds as counsel claim. The rule was there applied to ·exclude not a
grandchild of deceased, but a grand nephew---1a collateral.
The Court there cited and followed the California Court
in the R~e Curry's Estate, 3'9 Cal. 529.
Walgren v. Taylor (W. Va.), 45 S.E. 336 does not
decide the point. The question was one of advancement
and whether the doctrine of- '' hotch pot'' applied. The
statute said 'descendant' and the Court held that a collateral relative is not a descendant.
Carter v. Carter (Ky.), 270 S.W. 7'60 is a will case.
The Court held that the term '~children'' included grandchildren. However, the Court based its holding in part
on the no lapse statute and a'lso a statute providing that
''a devise to children embraces grandchildren when
there are no children, etc.'' Finally the Court said that
from the circumstances the intention of the testator was
clear to include the grandchildren.
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The case is not in point for the commission. There
are therefore hardly four jurisdictions that seem to support counsels claims as against about eight in our favor.
It is not what the word ''children" generally connotes, but what meaning should be ascribed under descent statutes and in circumstances where reason and
justice indicate a broader meaning.

v
THE LIFE ESTATE IS PROPERTY GOING T·O F. G.
WALTON.
1

Counsel make the point that ours is an estate tax
rather than an inheritance tax. We are unable to see the
relevancy of this claim. Also, our Court has said that
it is immaterial what one calls it, and not important to
so classify.
State Tax Commission v. Backman, 88 Utah 424, 55
P. 2d 171.
In Re Walker's Estate, 100 Utah 307, 114 P. 2d 1030.
We have difficulty in following counsel's atte1npt to
distinguish the Ithaca Case from this case because there
the Court explicitly held that the value of the life estate
to the widow was separate from the remainder and should
he valued separately.
Counsel seems to think that it is material to consider
to whom the remainder goes-whether to relatives or to
charity, and to consider on this question, the matter of
exemption as applied to the remainder.
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Counsel-cites Re Clark (Mont.), 114 A.L~R. 496 which
deals with retrospective tax statute and the distinction
between real and personal property in its devolution, but
so far as we c.an see does not touch any question here involved.
In Baily v. Drane (96 Tenn.), 16, 33 S.W. 573. There
was a life estate in trust for benefit of the mother of
testator (The brother was in a p·referred or exempted
class) . Remainder was to one not in the exempted class.
This remainder was held taxable and the life estate not
taxable.
The judgment should he affirmed.
E. A. WALTON,
.Attorney fo.r Resp,ondent
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